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A CRITICAL RACE THEORY CRITIQUE OF THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL UNDER TITLE

VII

Roy L. Brooks*
I

Critical Race Theory (hereinafter referred to as "CRT") is a relatively recent form of legal scholarship.' During its young history, CRT
has been applied almost exclusively in the context of civil rights law.
Some scholars, however, are now exploring other areas of application.2

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. J.D., 1975, Yale University.
1. Writings on critical race theory include: DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM
WELL: DIVINING THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter FACES AT THE BOTTOM
WELL]; DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d. ed. 1992) [hereinafter
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW]; DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE. ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Robin Barnes, Colloquy: Race

Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990); Scott Brewer, Introduction: Choosing Sides in the Racial
CritiquesDebate, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1844 (1990); Anthony Cook, Beyond CriticalLegal Studies:
Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King. Jr., 103 HARV L. REV. 985 (1990); Kimberl4
Crenshaw, Race Reform and Retrenchment: Transformationand Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988), Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginilizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Jerome Culp, Autobiography and
Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539
(1991); Jerome Culp, Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Authority in
the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095 (1992); Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical
Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Brewer's Plea]; Richard
Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallelsin Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1547 (1991); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar
Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing. Ten Years Later. 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349
(1992); Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1872 (1990); Richard
Delgado, Review Essay: Recasting the American Race Problem. 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1389 (1991)
(reviewing Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM) [hereinafter Recasting]; Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 95 (1990) [hereinafter When a Story Is Just a Story]; Linda Greene, Breaking Form (book
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At its most basic level, CRT is an attempt to approach legal problems and questions from the perspective of people of color. That is,
CRT endeavors to deconstruct what normally passes among legal scholars as objective and neutral rules of law, legal doctrines, and legal
relationships. The purpose of this intellectual excursion is to uncover
racial subordination that might otherwise go unnoticed.
Professor Richard Delgado, one of the most gifted, influential, and
prolific critical race theorists, lists the following characteristics of CRT
in addition to a sensitivity to racial implications in law:
(1) an insistence on "naming our own reality"; (2) the belief
that knowledge and ideas are powerful; (3) a readiness to
question basic premises of moderate/incremental civil rights
law; (4) the borrowing of insights from social science on race
and racism; (5) critical examination of the myths and stories
powerful groups use to justify racial subordination; (6) a
more contexualized treatment of doctrine; (7) criticism of
liberal legalism; and (8) an interest in structural determinism
the ways in which
legal tools and thought-structures can
4
impede law reform.
My ambition in this article is to use CRT as a basis for analyzing
a new and important amendment to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights

review), 44 STAN. L. REV. 909 (1992); Alex Johnson, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia: A
Reply in Favor of Context, 43 STAN L. REV. 137 (1990); Alex Johnson, The New Voices of
Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of the Legal Academia,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989), Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative
Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
1, (1988); Marl Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repartations, 22
HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of
the UniversalistIdeal and the Hope of Plural Justice - Some Observations and Questions of
an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. (1991); Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local
Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 S.D. L. REV. 1043 (1988); Jon
Weiner, Law Profs Fight the Power, THE NATION. 4/11, 1989, at 246; Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructuringIdeals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV.
401 (1987). Not all the above scholars consider themselves to be race crits.
2. Some legal scholars are beginning to explore the use of CRT outside the field of civil
rights law. For example, Professor Beverly Moran of the University of Wisconsin Law School
is studying tax law from a CRT perspective. Some believe that CRT can be applied to every
course in the law school curriculum, and that this will in fact happen by the end of the decade.
3. See, e.g., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 1, at 2; AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED, supra note 1, at 3, 248-258; Brewer's Plea, supra note 1, at 12.
4. When a Story is Just a Story, supra note 1, at 95 n.1.
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namely the right to a jury trial in employment discrimination
involving
compensatory or punitive damages.6 After elaborating
cases
on the right to a trial by jury, including the jury-trial amendment to
Title VII, I shall address the following question: Is the right to a trial
by jury in Title VII cases a positive development from a CRT perspective? I conclude that critical race theorists would probably answer
this question in the negative.
II

The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution states: "In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law. ''1 Based on
the language that, "In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved . . . " according to the rules of the common

law," the courts have ruled that either the plaintiff or the defendant
is entitled to a jury trial in all actions at law ("Suits at common law"),
but not in actions in equity. The right to a trial by jury which may
be exercised by either party, is "preserved" only for those types of
claims that could have been brought in a court of law at common law.s
Although the distinction between law and equity jurisdiction was
never absolute (e.g., the "clean up" doctrine permitted an equity court
to decide issues that ordinarily would have been decided by a jury in
an action at law9), the distinction has become less clear in modern

5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h
through 6.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(c), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c) (1992). The right to
a trial by jury was also extended to claims involving compensatory or punitive damage filed
under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (commonly called the "ADA"), Pub. L. No.
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.),
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982). The ADA prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability in a broad range of areas of American life - such as employment,
public facilities, transportation, and telecommunications. In contrast, the Rehabilitation Act only
prohibits discrimination by federal contractors and sub-contractors and by schools and other
recipients of federal financial assistance. The need for the ADA is clear.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The right to a jury trial is a fundamental guarantee of the
rights and liberties of the American people. See Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882).
8. See generally Fleming James, Right to Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655
(1963); Austin W. Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV.
669 (1918).
9. See Harold Chesin & Geoffrey Hazard, Chancery Procedureand the Seventh Amendment:
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times with the merger of law and equity and with the creation of new
causes of action in response to a social and political order that is vastly
more complex than and different from the social and political order
of 1791.10 In addition, the wisdom of allowing the exercise of the right
to a trial by jury in complex cases has been called into question."
Despite these problems, the Supreme Court has in principle remained faithful to an historical approach when determining whether
the right to a jury trial can be asserted in a given case. 12 But since
the merger of law and equity, many remedies once available only in
a court of equity have now become "legal." Consequently, the scope
of equity as an historical reference point has been narrowed, and this
historical change, in turn, has resulted in the expansion of the right
to a jury trial since the merger of law and equity.13
In the case of a new claim created by statute - one that has no
common-law antecedent - Congress can grant the right to a jury
trial. 14 When Congress established the right to be free of employment

Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 YALE L. J. 999 (1974); see also Ziebarth
v. Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261 (N.D. 1976).
10. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987) (even though the statutory
action is similar to a common law action at law, the entire statutory action cannot be tried to
a jury); People v. Superior Court, 507 P.2d 1400 (1973) (when statute creating a new cause of
action does not explicitly restrict a court's general equity powers, a court in equity may exercise
the full range of those powers, and issue does not need to be presented to a jury).
11. Arguments have been made in a number of courts that complex cases are beyond the
competence of the jury. See e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1980) (although there is no "complexity" exception to the Seventh Amendment, there
may be some instances in which a case is so complex that a jury trial would violate the Fifth
Amendment right to due process). Cf. United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied sub nom Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980) (there is no complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment).
12. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990);
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Beacon
Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 259 U.S. 500 (1959).
13. See generally 5 J. WM.MOORE, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.16(2) (2d ed. 1988);
9 CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §
2301, at 12 (1971).
14. When Congress creates a new statutory right, it can expressly grant a right to trial
by jury. Less clear are the circumstances under which Congress can establish a new statutory
right in such a way that denies the parties' right to a jury trial. In Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (involving an employer's
challenge to OSHA's work place safety regulations before an administrative law judge), the
Supreme Court held that when "Congress creates new statutory 'public rights,' it may assign
their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible"
without violating the constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 455. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), the Supreme Court stressed that its "prior cases support adminis-
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discrimination in Title VII, however, it denied the right to a jury trial
by expressly giving courts authority to grant only "equitable relief."'15
Such relief includes back pay for a limited period of time, reinstatement, hiring, or promotion. 16 Compensatory and punitive damages
were not allowed.
The Civil Rights Act of 199117 amends Title VII to authorize a
trial court to award compensatory and punitive damages to the complaining party in cases alleging intentional discrimination 8 and to provide for the right to a jury trial where such damages are sought. 19
Thus, once the complaining party requests compensatory or punitive
damages, either party may invoke the right to a jury trial 0 While
critical race theorists would undoubtedly find the damages amendment
to Title VII beneficial to people of color, I doubt that they would
reach the same conclusion with respect to the jury-trial amendment.
III
The central tenet of CRT is that racism is an ingrained and permanent feature of American society. American culture is naturally racist;
ergo Americans and their institutions, which feed off American culture,

trative factflnding in only those situations involving 'public rights,' e.g., where the Government
is . . . creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases, as
well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated." Id. at 51. The statutory rights
in Nordberg - a bankruptcy trustee's right to recover a fraudulent conveyance against one
who is not a creditor of the bankrupt debtor - was deemed to be "private" rather than "public,"
and, hence, entitled to a jury trial. Fraudulent conveyance actions by bankruptcy trustees "are
quintessential suits at common law that more nearly resemble state-law contract claims brought
by a bankrupt corporation to agument the bankruptcy estate than they do creditors' hierarchically
ordered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res. They therefore appear matters of
" Id. at 56. The Supreme Court's reasoning in this area
private rather than public right ..
begs the question. Further, does Congress' power to limit the right to a jury trial turn on the
distinction between "public" and "private" rights or on a determination that the jury is incompatible in one type of proceedings (e.g., in administrative proceedings, as the Court notes in
Atlas Roofing) but not in another type of proceeding (e.g., in bankruptcy proceedings, as the
Court states in Nordberg)?
15. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5g (1992). Congress wanted trial courts to have the flexibility and
discretionary powers of a court of equity so that they could "fashion the most complete relief
possible." 118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972). See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
16. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5g (1992).
17. 2 U.S.C. §§ 601, 1201 through 1224; 16 U.S.C. § la-5 note; 29 U.S.C. § 626; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 through 1981a, 1988, 2000e through 2000e-2, 2000e-4 through 2000e-5, 2000e-16, 12111,
12112, 12209 (1992).
18. Section 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1992). Section 102(b)(3) caps these damages at various
amounts depending on the size of the employer's work force.
19. Section 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c) (1992).
20. Id.
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are naturally racist. Thus, rather than an extreme, grotesque or abnormal phenomenon, racism is the norm in American society. It is
part of the natural order of things in our society.21
Professor Richard Delgado elaborates on this important assertion
in CRT. He states that most white Americans, including judges and
legislators
treat racism as an anomaly, an illness, a sort of cancer on
an otherwise healthy body. [Racist acts are deemed to be]
• . . deviations from a status quo or baseline assumed to
represent equality. If we spot such a deviation, we punish
it. But most racism is not a deviation. As a number of Critical
writers have been pointing out, racial subordination is an
ordinary, "normal" feature of our social landscape. It is "normal science" - the ordinary state of affairs. Because racism
is an ingrained feature of our cultural landscape, it looks
ordinary and natural to everyone in that culture. It is "the
way things are." Formal equal opportunity is thus calculated
to remedy at most the more extreme and shocking forms of
racial treatment; it can do little about the business-as-usual
types of racism that people of color confront every day and
that account for much of our subordination, poverty, and
despair.It is clear that the concept of racism is crucial to an understanding
of CRT. The race crits' concept of racism is taken from a famous
statement presented to the United States Civil Rights Commission a
generation ago by Anthony Downs. There, Downs explained racism
as follows:
Racism is one of those words that many people use, and feel
strongly about, but cannot define very clearly. Those who
suffer from racism usually interpret the word one way while
others interpret it quite differently. This ambiguity is possible in part because the word refers to ideas that are very
complicated and hard to pin down. Yet, before we can fully
understand how racism works or how to combat its harmful
effects, we must first try to define it clearly even though
such an attempt may be regarded as wrong by many.
Perhaps the best definition of racism is an operational
one. This means that it must be based upon the way people

21.

See generally FACES AT THE BoTToM WELL, supra note 1; RACE, RACISM AND AMER-

ICAN LAW, supra note 1.

22.

Recasting, supra note 1, at 1393-1394 (footnotes omitted).
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actually behave, rather than upon logical consistency or
purely scientific ideas. Therefore, racism may be viewed as
any attitude, action, or institutional structure which subordinates a person or group because of his or their color. Even
though "race" and "color" refer to two different kinds of
human characteristics, in America it is the visibility of skin
color - and of other physical traits associated with particular
color or groups - that marks individuals as "targets" for
subordination by members of the white majority. This is
true of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans,
Japanese Americans, Chinese Americans, and American Indians. Specifically, white racism subordinates members of
all these other groups primarily because they are not white
in color, even though some are technically considered to be
members of the "white race" and even view themselves as
"whites." . . .2
Thus, the race crits define racism in both "substantive"; and "procedural"; terms.- It is not simply prejudicial attitudes, or traditional
racism (the belief in white superiority, black inferiority), 25 that draws
the race crits' attention. They are equally, if not more, concerned with
individual or institutional behavior that has the effect of placing persons of color in positions subordinate to whites.
Based on this concept of racism, critical race theorists would probably argue that Title VII's jury-trial amendment is "racist." The
amendment subordinates people of color because it places issues of
liability, as well as damages, in the hands of a quintessential American
institution - the jury - that is a fortiori racist. The Rodney King
verdict is the most visible but not the only instance of racism in the
jury box. 26 Studies involving interviews of white jurors and statistical
analyses of jury performance in racial cases (including cases in which
African Americans were convicted of particular crimes and given the
death sentence disproportionately more often than whites) clearly demonstrate that there is racism in the jury box. 27 One should not be

23. Anthony Downs, Racism in American and How to Combat It,
5-6 (1970).

UNITED STATES COM-

MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

24.
25.

26.

Does Voice Really Matter, supra note 1, at 104-106 (citations omitted).
See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 704 (1966).
See generally RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 1, § 5.14 (sources cited

therein).
27. Id. § 5.14, at 351 (sources cited therein).
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surprised if the demand for a jury trial in Title VII cases is made
more often by the defendant than the plaintiff.
Curtis v. Loethers illustrates the concerns critical race theorists
might have with the jury-trial amendment. Curtis (plaintiff), an African American woman, brought an action under section 812 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968,2 claiming that Loether and others (defendants),
who were white, had refused to rent an apartment to her because of
her race.3 0 Plaintiffs complaint sought only injunctive relief and punitive damages; a claim for compensatory relief was added later.3' Defendants (not the plaintiff) made a timely demand for a jury trial in their
answer.32 The district court denied the request for a jury trial, stating
that a jury trial was not authorized by the statute nor required by
the Seventh Amendment. After trial on the merits, the district judge
found that defendants had discriminated against plaintiff. The judge
found no actual damages but did award $250 punitive damages. The
court of appeals reversed on the jury-trial issue,3 and the Supreme
Court affirmed.4
Why did the plaintiff, an African American woman, try to avoid
a jury trial? She did not want a jury because she feared that the jury
might be racist and that this racism might affect the outcome of her
case . Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall, himself an African
American, felt impelled to respond to the fear that jury prejudice
might adversely affect victims of discrimination. Justice Marshall did
not deny the existence of jury racism, even though he might define
the term "racism" more narrowly than critical race theorists. But he
believed that procedural safeguards were in place to protect persons
of color from jury racism. The judgment n.o.v. and motion for a new
trial provided adequate protection against jury racism affecting the

28. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3612 (1992). This statute is commonly known as the Fair Housing
Act.
30. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 190. Section 812 authorizes private plaintiffs to bring civil actions
to redress violations of the fair housing provisions of the Act. Id. at 189. Under this section,
the court may grant injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and award actual and punitive
damages. Id. at 189-90. The Act was amended in 1988.
31. Id. at 190. A preliminary injunction was issued which eventually dissolved because the
plaintiff had obtained other housing. The case went to trial only on the issues of actual and
punitive damages. Id.
32.

Id.

33.
34.
35.

Id. at 191. See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972).
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 191.
Id. at 190.
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outcome of a case, Justice Marshall said.36 Thus, Justice Marshall
concluded that the plaintiffs concern was "insufficient to overcome
87
the clear command of the Seventh Amendment.
The problem with Justice Marshall's calculation, critical race
theorists would contend, is that it is abstract and noncontextual.3
That is, it does not factor in the socioeconomic conditions of the persons
who are most likely to bring civil rights claims. These persons racial minorities and women - usually do not have the time, money,
or flexibility in their lives to file post-trial motions, whether it be to
challenge jury racism or for some other purpose. Title VII litigation
is protracted and expensive litigation.3 9 Simply filing a complaint in
Title VII litigation is difficult enough for many persons of color, especially for people unemployed as a result of the alleged discrimination.
Thus, post-trial motion practice may offer only hypothetical protection
against jury bias. Such procedure may be effectively unavailable to
people of color. And when it is available, it will delay final resolution
of Title VII cases.
Furthermore, demonstrating a causal relationship between biased
jury deliberations and the verdict in a single case is difficult at best.
How would one do this? By interviewing the jurors? Who would talk?
Who would tell the truth? And can the plaintiff afford to interview
those who are willing to speak truthfully?
Racist decisionmaking is also a possibility, race crits would have
to acknowledge, in nonjury trials under Title VII and other civil rights
statutes. Given their definition of racism,40 the race crits would have
to concede that at least some judges are "naturally" racist. But perhaps
critical race theorists are willing to take their chances with a single
decisionmaker who just may be more enlightened than other judges
41
and who, in any event, has to commit his or her reasoning to writing.
In such a situation, one must accept the lesser of two evils.
IV
I do not consider myself to be a critical race theorist. For one
thing, the CRT concept of racism sweeps too broadly for my tastes.

36. Id. at 198. The judgment n.o.v. is now called the renewal of motion for judgment as
a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. PROC.
37. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195.
38. See supra text accompanying note 4.
39.

See Roy L.

BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM

70 (1990).

40. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
41. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 ("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury .
the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .").
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But one does not have to be a race crit to appreciate its contributions
to legal scholarship and analysis. CRT adds depth and understanding
to the law, especially civil rights law. By deconstructing "neutral" or
even seemingly pro-minority rules of law in their own special way,
critical race theorists help us all see farther and clearer than we
otherwise might see.
Analyzing Title VII's jury-trial amendment from a CRT perspective
illustrates this point well. Along with the amendment authorizing compensatory and punitive damages, the jury-trial amendment seems beneficial to Title VII plaintiffs. Indeed, both amendments were part of
a civil rights bill designed to strengthen Title VII.4 But the jury-trial
amendment may well have the opposite effect. It may weaken Title
VII - make it more difficult for minority plaintiffs to win disparate
treatment cases43 - by giving racial prejudice greater opportunity
than it previously had to influence the outcome of Title VII cases.

42. For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991: What Does It Mean and What Is Its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304
(1992).
43. Disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) cases may constitute the greatest
number of cases filed under Title VII. A recent study concludes that disparate impact (discrimination characterized by disproportionate effects) cases accounted for less than 2% of all discrimination cases filed under Title VII between January 1, 1985 and March 31, 1987. John J. Donohue
III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
STAN. L. REV. 983, 998, n.57 (1991).

